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“we live in continuous change, and ... as we change for the 
better or worse, we are called happy or unhappy” (E5p39s)
 One  of  Spinoza's  basic  metaphysical  theses  is  that  the  “essence
[essentia]” of any existing thing is “power [potentia]”. That is, a Spinozistic
essence is not merely the set of properties necessary and sufficient for a thing
to exist  (as some scholars gloss Spinoza's definition of essence,  E2def2),
but also a causal power.1 As Spinoza himself puts the claim,
the power of each thing, or the striving by which it (either alone or 
with others)  does  anything,  or  strives  to  do anything –  i.e.  (by  
[3]p6), the power, or striving, by which it strives to persevere in its 
being, is nothing but the given, or actual, essence of the thing itself 
[cujuscunque rei  potentia sive conatus quo ipsa vel  sola  vel  cum aliis  
quidquam agit  vel  agere  conatur  hoc  est  (per  propositionem 6  hujus)  
potentia sive conatus quo in suo esse perseverare conatur, nihil est praeter 
ipsius rei datam sive actualem essentiam.] (E3p7d)2 
1 For  this  point  cf.  Viljanen  2011:74-5.  For  the  former  gloss  of  Spinozistic
essence, see e.g. Bennett 1984:§16.2; Crane and Sandler 2005. 
I will use the following abbreviations for Spinoza's works: E = Ethics;
KV = Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being; CM = Appendix Containing
Metaphysical  Thoughts.  In  citing  from  the  Ethics  I  will  use  the  following
abbreviations: ax = axiom, def = definition, p = proposition, d = demonstration,
s = scholium, c = corollary, app = appendix, pref = preface. “NS” refers to the
posthumous 1677 Dutch edition of Spinoza’s writings,  De Nagelate Schriften
van B.D.S.
2 Cf. E3p54d, E3p57d, E1p34, E1p11s (II/54). 
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Call this the identity of power and essence doctrine. The doctrine is
crucial to Spinoza's broader conception of causality: it helps explain how
there comes to be a world (it is necessarily produced by the divine essence
[E1p16),  and  it  underlies  the  conatus  doctrine,  governing  what  “each
thing” (E3p7d) in nature can and must do.3 And, as Michael Della Rocca
has pointed out, a commitment to the identity of power and essence also
means  that  Spinoza  can  reject  both  the  occasionalist  denial  that  finite
things have genuine causal powers,  and any mechanist claim that such
powers belong to them only as extrinsic properties, not grounded in the
things' natures.4 
  In short, the identity of power and essence is an important, and
often  acknowledged,  element  of  Spinoza's  metaphysics.  Nonetheless,
there  have  been  few  attempts  to  say  how  precisely  Spinoza  might
understand this identity. A natural way to interpret it might be to take it to
mean that there is only something like a conceptual distinction between
The “actual” essence of a thing is contrasted with its formal essence:
the eternal and indiscernible implication of substantial essence (see E2p8c,s;
KV 2.20 n. C; I/97). In the rest of the paper I will speak of essences simpliciter,
treating the qualification “actual” as implicit unless otherwise noted. 
3 See  Della  Rocca  2008b  and  Hübner  forthcoming-a  for  the  claim  that
substance's  power  should  also  be  viewed  as  a  kind of  striving.  For  other
accounts of striving see e.g. Bennett 1984; Carriero 2011; Curley 1988; Garrett
2002;  Lebuffe  2014;  Lin  2006;  Nadler  2006;  Schrijvers  1999;  Viljanen  2011;
Youpa 2003.
4 Della Rocca 2012.
I will not examine here in detail  Spinoza's reasons for embracing the
identity of power and essence. Roughly, they can be summarized as follows:
(i) from the claim that God's essence suffices for the production of all things,
Spinoza infers that the essence of God is identical to a causal power (E1p34d);
(ii) given substance-monism, all things other than God can only be necessary
modifications of God's essential nature, that is, determinations of this power
(cf. E4p4d).
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essences and powers.5 It also seems plausible that such an identity means
that  at  least  collectively  all of  a  thing's  essential  properties  are  causally
efficacious – that together they constitute an efficient cause – even if it's
not obvious that individually each of the essentially properties must also
be causally efficacious. It  also seems tempting to allow that Spinozistic
essences may be identical not just to a single causal power, but to whole
collections  of  qualitatively  distinct  powers,  some  of  which  may
individually be essential also to other things. This is  not only arguably
intuitively  more  plausible  as  an  account  of  what  it  might  mean  as  a
metaphysical thesis to identify essence and power; the same conclusion is
also suggested by Spinoza's account of the sage:  
It  is  the part  of a wise man [viri  sapientis],  I  say, to refresh and  
restore himself in moderation with pleasant food and drink, with 
scents,  with the beauty of  green plants,  with decoration, music,  
sports, the theater, and other things of this kind, which anyone can 
use without injury to another. For the human Body is composed of 
a great many parts of different natures, which constantly require  
new and varied  nourishment,  so  that  the  whole  Body  may  be  
equally capable of all the things which can follow from its nature, 
and  hence,  so  that  the  Mind  also  may  be  equally  capable  of  
understanding many things. (E4p45c2s; II/244)6
On Spinoza's telling, the person who perfects human nature exercises in
moderation no just a single power but a whole panoply of powers – the
power  to  eat,  smell,  see,  listen,  think,  etc.  Given  Spinoza's  naturalistic
inclinations – that is, given his belief that all things observe the same laws,
5 See  e.g.  Descartes,  Principles  1.62.  For  Spinoza's  use  of  this  schema  of
distinctions see e.g. E1p10s.
6 The trope of the sage is arguably part of Spinoza's Stoic inheritance. On this
inheritance see e.g. James 1993, Kristeller 1984, Miller 2009, Rutherford 1999,
Schmitter 2014. 
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and differ in properties only by degree7 – what is true of human beings is
presumably  true,  to  some  degree,  also  of  other  things:  what  may  be
essential to all of them may be sets of certain powers. But allowing for a
thing's  essence  to  be  identical  to  such  collections  of  powers  raises  of
course the question of what assures the  unity  of these powers, such that
together they can be identical to an essence, and be distinguished from all
merely accidental powers that a thing might also have. 
 In short, although Spinoza's thesis of identity of power and essence
is well-known, it seems to be known only in a rough outline. More work
needs to be done to fill in the missing details of the account, and to explore
the extent to which we are in fact entitled to attribute the above intuitions
and plausible glosses to Spinoza. What is particularly regrettable is  the
lack of attention to how this doctrine of the identity of power and essence
might bear on Spinoza's psychological commitments about powers.8 For, as
is also well  known, the notion of power is equally central to Spinoza's
conception  of  an “affect  [affectus]”,  or  what  we are  more  likely  to  call
today  an  emotion  or  sentiment.9 More  specifically,  what  is  central  for
Spinoza's psychology is the idea of variations, or fluctuations, in power.
This is  what,  in Spinoza's view, all  affects  fundamentally are:  increases
and decreases in a thing's degree of power (E3def3). But, as we shall see in
more  detail  below,  the  coexistence  of  this  conception of  an affect  with
Spinoza's metaphysical commitment to an identity of power and essence
has, prima facie at least, troublesome consequences. Namely, it seems to
undermine (i) the consistency  of  Spinoza's account of essence across his
7 See  E3pref  (II/138);  E1app  (II/83);  E2p13s  (II/96).  On  Spinoza's  scalar  (or
incremental) naturalism see Della Rocca 2008b; Garrett 2002, 2008.
8 But see footnote 48.
For the purposes of this paper I will understand by 'psychology' only
that part of Spinoza's philosophical psychology that deals with affects. 
9 On Spinoza's  theory of  emotions see e.g.  Alanen 2012,  Bennett  1984,  Della
Rocca 2008, 2008b, James 1997, Lebuffe 2009, Nadler 2006, 2011, Rutherford
1999, Shapiro 2012, Yovel 1999. For discussions of early modern theories of
emotions more generally see e.g. James 1997, 1998, Pickavé and Shapiro 2012,
Schmitter 2014.
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metaphysics and his psychology (and hence his ability to make good on
his  promise  to  derive  ethical  and  psychological  doctrines  from
metaphysical  ones);10 (ii)  the  coherence  and  plausibility  of  Spinoza's
metaphysical views on individuation; and finally (iii) the coherence and
plausibility of Spinoza's account of affects, especially in what concerns the
pivotal notion of emotional “servitude [servitus]”, from which Spinoza's
philosophy is meant to rescue us.11 
The objective  of this paper is, first,  to examine and resolve these
apparent  difficulties,  and  then  to  use  this  discussion  to  arrive  at  an
improved understanding of Spinoza's ontology as it bears on both affects
and on essences – and, in particular, an improved understanding of the
sense in which Spinozistic essences are identical to powers. To anticipate,
briefly,  I  will  conclude  that  we  cannot  simply  –  or  without  further
qualification – identify “power” and “essence”. I  propose instead that we
treat Spinozistic essences as in part intrinsically determinable, with affective
changes in power supplying the relevant determinations. I also argue that
Spinoza's  claim  that  affects  “constitute”  an  essence  means  that  affects
modify or determine this essence as a particular desire, appetite or volition.
Finally, I propose that among a thing's essential properties, necessary and
sufficient for it to be itself, is the range of fluctuations in power that it can
undergo. 
Let me say a few words about how the paper will unfold. In the
next  section  I  will  start  with  a  plausible  initial  account  of  Spinoza's
ontology of affects, paying attention in particular to the way that Spinoza's
claims  about  affects  are  grounded  in  his  more  general  metaphysical
commitments about minds, bodies, essences and causes.12 In Section 2 I
10 See e.g. E2pref. For similar worries in relation to other Spinozistic doctrines
see e.g. Rutherford 1999 and Bennett 1984 ch. 10.
11 See e.g. E5pref. 
The trope of a servitude to emotions is of course well-established in the
history of philosophy, and familiar in particular from Stoicism. For readings
that stress Spinoza's Stoic heritage see note 6. 
12 My account in this section is not intended to be exhaustive,  not just as an
account of Spinozistic affects, but even as an account of the ontology of affects.
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will draw out the difficulties implicit in this initial account. In response to
these difficulties, in Section 3 and 4 I will develop an amended account,
and address potential objections to my proposal.
1. Spinoza's ontology of affects: first attempt
1.1. Spinoza's own assessment of the situation is that “no one” thus far has
succeeded  in  “determin[ing]  the  nature  and  powers  of  the  Affects”
(E3pref; II/139). His own proposal begins with the following definition of
an affect:13
By affect I understand affections of the Body by which the Body's 
power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and
at  the  same time,  the  ideas  of  these  affections  [corporis  affectiones  
quibus ipsius corporis agendi potentia augetur vel minuitur, juvatur vel 
coercetur et simul harum affectionum ideas] (E3def3; emphasis added) 
To  better  understand  this  definition,  it  helps  to  recall  how  Spinoza
conceives  of  minds  and  bodies.  What  is  particularly  germane  for  our
purposes are the following three claims. First, for Spinoza a “mind” is just
a collection of ideas which essentially has a certain actually existing body
as  its  intentional  object  (E2p11,13).  Second,  this  mind  represents,  with
some degree of clarity and distinctness, all of the affections (modifications,
determinations) of its body (that is, all affections at least partially inhering
in that body) (E2p12).14 Finally,  pairs  of  minds and bodies are in some
sense  identical – they constitute “one and the same”entity – and exhibit
one and the same causal order (E2p7s).15
In particular, I won't be able to discuss here the causality of affects, and the
related distinction between active and passive affects. For discussion see e.g.
Alanen 2012, Bennett 1984, James 1997, Lebuffe 2009.
13 On Spinoza's view, definitions generally articulate the essences of  things (see
e.g. E1p8s2 [II/50]).
14 Here  I  follow  Garrett's  2008  gloss  of  E2p12  in  terms  of  inherence  (which
relation I take to be minimally a relation of ontological dependence). 
15 For accounts of these difficult theses see e.g. Bennett 1984, Della Rocca 2008b,
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Now, Spinoza's  definition states that  an “affect” takes place if two
conditions are met: namely, (i) if a thing's degree of causal power changes
on account of some bodily modification, and (ii) if there is an idea of that
affection in the mind. That is, the term “affect” picks out a certain kind of
bodily affection –  the  kind that  increases  or  decreases  a  body's  causal
power  –  together  with  an idea  representing  this  bodily  affection.16 That
there will be such an idea in the mind, given the bodily affection,  follows
straightforwardly  from  Spinoza's  aforementioned  commitment  to  each
mind's  'omniscience'  with  regard  to  everything  that  to  some  degree
inheres in its body: a modification or affection of the body is clearly 'in' that
body (if perhaps also in other bodies); so also it will be represented by an idea in
the intentionally-related mind.17
The  waxing  and  waning  of  bodily  power  brought  about  by  the
bodily affection can in turn be understood in terms of what this body can
do,  and,  more  specifically,  in  terms  of  how many different  effects  this
body is  determined to bring about  at  any particular  time.18 Since such
Gueroult 1968, Melamed 2013, Nadler 2006, Hübner forthcoming-b.
16 Thus, similarly to Alanen 2012, I disagree with accounts that take Spinoza to
reduce affects to mental representations alone (e.g. Della Rocca 2008, 2008b).
Spinoza  indeed  seems  to  treat  affects  as  if  they  were  purely mental
phenomena in E3GenDefAff (and E4p8, which appeals to E3GenDefAff). But
there  are  at  least  two  good  reasons  to  be  suspicious  of  how  'general'
E3GenDefAff really is. First, it is preceded by the comment that “we shall be
able to define the affects, insofar as they are related only to the Mind, as follows”
(my emphasis).  Second,  E3GenDefAff  identifies  affects  with  passive  affects
alone. 
For other definitions that pick out a thing under multiple attributes see
e.g. E1def6, E3p9s. 
See Beyssade 1999:117 for a distributive reading of the definition. 
17 Like any bodily affection, the affection in question can be understood in terms
of  certain  alterations  of  constituent  simpler  bodies  (for  example,  as  an
impression of some “image” by an external body, or as a change in speed or
direction). See e.g. E2ax3'', E2L6 (II/100).
18 See E2p13s (II/97). Cf. also CM2.12 (I/280), which glosses “power” as being the
“sufficient cause” of effects. 
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changes in power can fundamentally be either an increase or a decrease,
Spinoza also holds that there are two basic kinds of  affects:  I  feel  “joy
[laetitia]” when my power goes up; “sadness [tristitia]” when it decreases
(E3p11s; II/148).19
The fact that Spinoza appears to restrict changes in power relevant
to  affects  to  what  could  be  described  as  merely  'quantitative' changes
seems to call for an explanation. For even if we grant Spinoza the premise
that  affects  essentially  involve  changes  in  bodily  power,20 why  should
such changes consist solely in increases or decreases, and not for example
also in changes in kind? (Why, for example, could not some “joy” involve
a transition from having the power to speak to having the power to sing?)
Spinoza's view is in fact less arbitrarily restrictive than it might at first
appear.  Given  his  quasi-nominalist  views,  opposing  categories  such  as
“quantitative” and “qualitative”, “degree” and “kind”, “power to sing”
versus “power to speak” reflect only our more and less  well-grounded
ways of thinking about particulars in nature.21 And there seems to be no
good reason to rule out apriori the possibility that what we might describe
as a higher “degree” of a certain power – a greater intensive magnitude –
Like any bodily affection, the affection that brings about a fluctuation
in power in affective experience can have been brought about either by the
thing's own essence or by this essence in conjunction with external causes (cf.
E2ax1''[II/99];  E2p16, E3def2). In the former case, it cannot lead to a decrease
in power (E3p6, E3p12). 
19 Spinoza  sometimes  includes  “desire”  –  the  “conscious”  production  of
essential effects in thought and extension (E3p9s) – in his list of basic affects
(e.g. E3DefAff4exp; II/192). I take it that this is because joy and sadness  are
desire but qua increased or decreased (cf. E3p57d; cf. Nadler 2006:204). For
other interpretations see e.g. Bennett 1984:§59-60. 
20 This  is  not  an  implausible  premise.  Contemporary  theorists  of  emotions
generally agree that at least the simpler emotions are governed by the basic
needs of organisms, such as mating, or defense against predators. On this see
e.g. de Sousa 2014. 
Many early moderns tied affects to self-preservation; see James 1998.
21 For a more detailed account see Hübner forthcoming-c.
8
could also be describable as a new “kind” of power.22
E3def3 has  a misleadingly restrictive appearance also  in  another
way:  the  definition  mentions  explicitly  only  bodily  power.  Nonetheless,
Spinoza's  considered  view cannot  be  that  affects  involve  changes  in  a
body's power as opposed to a mind's power, such that the mind's power –
its capacity to produce a variety of effects on its own – remains unchanged
in  affective  experiences.  Such  a  claim  would  contravene  Spinoza's
aforementioned  commitment  to  the  sameness  of  the  causal  order  that
obtains  among  thinking  things  and  corporeal  things.  This  sameness
demands that whenever the power of a given body changes (for example,
if it now produces a greater variety of motions in neighbouring bodies),
the  power  of  the  mind  identical  to  this  body  must  change
correspondingly.  Otherwise  the  causal  orders  would  come  apart:  at  a
given  point  in  time,  more  effects  would  be  generated in  the  extended
world than in the thinking world (or vice versa). Spinoza makes the point
that  the  power  to  think  also  fluctuates  in  affects  explicitly  in  another
22 This is a reason to resist Gilead's suggestion that affective change “is modal or
quantitative rather than essential or qualitative” (1999:171).
E3def3 describes the fluctuating power not just as power simpliciter
but as  a “power of  acting [potentia  agendi]”.  However,  I  think this  too is  a
merely apparent restriction: “power” and “power of acting” are more and less
elliptical labels for the same power. The reason is this: in Spinoza's framework
all  power  is  ultimately  just  substance's  power  of  acting,  i.e.  its  power  to
produce  effects  autonomously,  whether  immediately  or  through  the
mediation of modes. There is no other power over and above that: there are
merely  the  various  unequal  distributions  and  lacks  of  this  power,  and
different ways of talking about this single metaphysical reality.
That  for  Spinoza  “power  of  acting”  is  not  distinct  from  power
simpliciter is  also borne out textually:  Spinoza explicitly  identifies  the two
terms  (as  well  as  identifying  them with  “striving”  and with  the  “force  of
existing [vis existendi]”): see E3GenDefAff (II/204), E3p7d, E3p28d, E3p55c[2]d
(II/183), E3p54d, E4p14d. 
For a different gloss of power of acting see Schrijvers 1999:73, Viljanen
2011:68-82. 
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definition, writing that in affects a mind is “determine[d] ... to think of this
rather  than  that”  (E3GenDefAff;  II/203).  In  his  view  certain  ideas  (for
example,  the  idea  of  God)  are  intrinsically  richer  in  implications  than
others, and more capable of fertile “agreements” with other ideas. Affects
that determine us to have these sorts of ideas increase our power to think.
Given that affective changes in power can in principle be described
from the point of  view of thought just  as  well  as the point of view of
extension,  why then does Spinoza's  opening definition focus on bodily
power alone? Presumably for the same reason that we must understand
bodies in order to understand our minds at all (E2p13s): our minds are in
their essential nature representations of bodies.
1.2 For Spinoza then, a modified bodily state, a new degree (and perhaps
also kind) of power, and a representation of all this in the mind is all there
is in metaphysical rigour to our sadnesses and joys.23 
23  What  we  represent  in  affective  experiences  according to  Spinoza  is  quite
complex.  From  E3def3  we  know  that  the  idea  that  is  part  of  an  affect
represents  the  power-altering  bodily  affection.  But,  according  to  a  later
definition, this idea also represents a “greater or lesser force of existing than
before” proper to the body, and it “indicate[s] or express[es] a constitution of
the Body … which the Body … has because [ex eo quod] its power of acting, or
[sive] force of existing, is increased or diminished” (E3GenDefAffexp; II/203-
4). Arguably then Spinoza holds (i) that the affective idea represents a bodily
affection  as  increasing  or  diminishing  bodily  power  (i.e  it  represents  this
affection in such a way as to thereby also represent the body as endowed with
a new degree of power); and that (ii) this idea is also conceptually related to (it
“expresses”  and  “indicates”)  another  idea,  a  representation  of  a  state  or
condition  that  the  body  acquires  as  a  result  of  a  change  in  its  power.
Presumably (iii)  there is  equally no power without a corresponding bodily
constitution that makes the exercise of this power possible (cf. 4p39d; II/240);
and (iv) there can be different sorts of conceptual relations between the two
ideas,  as  long  as  there  is,  to  borrow  from  Leibniz,  some  “constant  and
regulated relation  between what  can  be  said  of  the  one  [idea]  and of  the
other” (Letter to Arnauld, 9 October 1687). (For example, the representation of
the affection and new degree of power could imply something about how the
body's  simpler constituents  have been rearranged in the wake of  a loss  of
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But not only our sadnesses and joys. Spinoza's account of the affects
is a perfectly universal account, valid for every finite thing: in  Spinoza's
view  not  just  humans or  even all  'higher'  animals,  but  also  the  moon,
dandelions,  and  single-celled  protozoa  “feel  [sentire]”  in  the  affective
sense.24 Hence  in  the  Ethics  Spinoza  discusses  the  affects  of
“horse[s,....i]nsects, fish, and birds” and insists that “we cannot in any way
doubt that brutes feel [bruta sentire]” (E3p57s; II/187).25 
This, to say the least, is  an unorthodox claim. But it fits well with
Spinoza's  naturalistic and scalar  conception of being. In other words, we
can see Spinoza's  egalitarianism about affects as an expression of a more
general  commitment  to  a  scalar  naturalism  about  properties,  a
'panaffectism'  to  match  his  infamous  panpsychism.  More  precisely,  the
panaffectism follows quite straightforwardly from a combination of well-
known Spinozistic doctrines about minds and causes: (i) his panpsychism
(according to which all things are to some degree “minded”); (ii) his thesis
of  universal omniscience (according to which any mind to some degree
perceives  all  affections  inhering  in  the  corresponding  body);  (iii)  his
conatus doctrine (according to which from the essence of any thing some
power). 
E3GenDefAffexp  ostensibly  addresses  passive  affects  alone.  But  it
seems that the claims relevant in the present context hold equally for active
affects.
24 This  is  despite  some  translators'  occasional  tendency  to  introduce  explicit
references  to  human  beings  into  Spinoza's  discussions  of  affects  (see  e.g.
Curley's and Elwes' translations of E3p56d [II/185]).
Spinoza's  God  cannot  experience  affects  since  substance  cannot
experience  fluctuations  in  power  (E5p17;  though  see  also  E5p35;  for  one
explanation of the disparity see Della Rocca 2008b). 
25 Cf. E4p37s1. In the passage quoted, E3p57s, Spinoza mentions explicitly only
relatively complex animals, even though as we shall see shortly his doctrinal
commitments dictate a stronger thesis. I suspect that he focuses on the affects
of such relatively complex animals because in the  Ethics  he is interested in
things that are most  like us: only things that are significantly  like  us can be
“good” for us (E4p29).
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effects necessarily follow, but these effects cannot on their own decrease
this  thing's  degree  of  power);  and  (iv)  his  thesis  of  universal  finite
passivity (according to which all finite things are necessarily acted on by
potentially more powerful  external  causes).26 Since affects  by definition
consist of power-altering bodily affections and ideas of the changed power
and bodily state, it follows from these four doctrines that all finite things
can experience affects, since all finite things to some degree perceive all
their  bodily  affections  (given panpsychism and universal  omniscience),
and all finite things are also subject to fluctuations in power – both to the
sadnesses  that  follow from encounters with more powerful  antagonists
(given universal passivity), and to the joys that necessarily accompany a
thing's own striving (given the conatus doctrine).  
Nonetheless,  despite  systematic  considerations  in  favour  of  a
panaffectism, the fact  that  according to  Spinoza dandelions and single-
celled  protozoa  have  not  just  minds  but  also  feelings  will  to  some
undoubtedly seem only like a further reductio of his philosophy of mind.
Surely it should be possible, we may object, to avoid a Cartesian reduction
of animals to machines without going as far as to endow all finite things
with feelings?27 
I  will  not  defend  Spinoza  on  this  point.  But  one  consideration
should make his view slightly more palatable:  this is  that he holds not
only that all things “feel”,  in the affective sense, but also that they feel
differently.  The  differences  in  question  are  not  merely  accidental  or
extrinsic differences, but those that pertain to things essentially. That is, in
Spinoza's  view one and the same affect  cannot  be experienced by two
things with different essential natures. 
Spinoza lays out the reasoning behind this conclusion in  E3p57. I
26 See E2p13s, E3p4-12; E1p28, E4ax[1], E4p4,c; E4p3; E4p39d; E4p45s. 
27 See e.g. Part 5 of Descartes's  Discourse on the Method, or Malebranche's claim
that “in animals there is neither intelligence nor souls as is ordinarily meant.
They eat without pleasure, cry without pain, grow without knowing it; they
desire nothing, fear nothing, know nothing” (Search after Truth, VI.2.vii). 
For  a  classic  criticism  of  Spinoza's  philosophy  of  mind  see  Wilson
1999:126-40.
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cite the passage at length because it brings us directly to the problem of
identity of power and essence: 
Each affect of each individual differs from the affect of another as
much as the essence of the one differs from the essence of the other
[Quilibet  uniuscujusque  individui  affectus  ab  affectu  alterius  tantum
discrepat quantum essentia unius ab essentia alterius differt].
Dem.:...  Desire  [conscious  striving]  is  the  very  nature,  or
essence,  of  each  [individual]  ...  Therefore the  Desire  of  each
individual differs from the Desire of another as much as the nature,
or [sive] essence, of the one differs from the essence of the other. 
Next,  Joy  and  Sadness  are  passions  by  which  each  one's
power,  or  striving  to  persevere  in  its  being,  is  increased  or
diminished... So Joy and Sadness are the Desire,  or  Appetite, itself
insofar  as  it  is  increased  or  diminished,  aided  or  restrained,  by
external causes. I.e. ...they are the very nature of each [individual].
And so, the Joy or Sadness of each [individual] also differs from the
Joy or Sadness of another as much as the nature, or essence, of the
one differs from the essence of the other... 
Schol.:  From this  it  follows that  the  affects  of  the  animals
which are called irrational … differ from men's affects as much as
their  nature  differs  from human nature  [tantum differre  quantum
eorum natura a natura humana differt]. Both the horse and the man
are driven by a Lust to procreate; but the one is driven by an equine
Lust, the other by a human Lust. So also the Lusts and Appetites of
Insects,  fish,  and birds  must  vary....  there  is  no  small  difference
between the gladness by which a drunk is led and the gladness a
Philosopher possesses. (E3p57; transl. alt.)28
Spinoza's  main claim in this  passage is  that the affects of things
28 Cf. E4p37s1. Throughout this paper I  will use the term “individual” in the
generic sense of “entity” or “thing”, not in the technical sense of Spinoza's
physics (E2def[8]; II/99). 
13
differ “as much” as their “essences” do. To understand this claim, we need
to recall first how Spinoza thinks about the nature of essences. 
It  is  generally  agreed  that  he  holds  that  all  things  have  some
essential  properties,  and also  that  particulars  in  nature  possess  unique
essences (E2def2).29 But, as I have argued elsewhere,30 Spinoza's ontology
admits not only such unique essences of particulars but also more general
(less determinate) essences which characterize mind-dependent kinds. So,
on this view, if  the essence of any actually existing thing is identical to
some causal  power,  it  follows  that  there  is  some unique  set  of  causal
powers essential  to  every  thing,  and  necessary  and  sufficient  for  it  to
actually exist. (Presumably knowing what these unique powers are is part
of  scientia  intuitiva).31 But on the broader reading of Spinozistic  essence
that I have advocated, it also follows that finite knowers like us will take
certain causal powers to be essential to the kinds into which we categorize
particulars. For example, just as there is some unique set of causal powers
essential to me being myself, there is also a set of powers (presumably
those  sketched  in  Spinoza's  account  of  the  sage  in  E4p45c2s)  without
which  human beings  cannot  be  and  which  cannot  be  without  human
beings. The same will go for goldfish, drunks, and beings in general, with
the relevant causal  powers  specified each time at  appropriate  levels  of
generality.32 
29 See e.g. Bennett 1984:§16.2; Della Rocca 1996b:87, 2004:133; Gilead 1999:170;
Koistinen 1991:13-4.  
30 See  Hübner  forthcoming-c.  For  another  account  of  Spinozistic  kinds  see
Carriero 2011.
31 See E2p40s2 (II/122). More precisely, given Spinoza's modal views, the power
identical to the essence of a unique particular will be an actual, necessitated
formally-real causal process.
32 Any  causal  power  that  is  less  than  fully  determinate  and  unique  –  for
example, the generic powers to “reason” or  to “move” – will be for Spinoza a
mind-dependent  ens  rationis.  The  individuation  of  all  such powers  will  be
mind-dependent, and subject to more and less adequate grounding in genuine
similarities  among  formally  real  particulars.  For  more  detail  see  Hübner
forthcoming-c.
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Let's now return to Spinoza's claim that the affects of things differ
“as  much”  as  the  essences  of  things.  This  conclusion  follows  quite
straightforwardly  from  his  definition  of  an  affect  as  what  essentially
involves changes in a thing's essential power (E3def3). That is, affects of
things  endowed  with  distinct  essences  will  necessarily  differ  at  least
insofar  as  these  affects  will  essentially  involve  fluctuations  in  distinct
essential powers.  Indeed, more precisely, affects will differ from thing to
thing not only “as much as” the essences of these things differ but more
precisely they will necessarily differ  because  the essences, or the essential
powers, of these things differ. In other words, given the identity of power
and essence, and given Spinoza's definition of affect as a fluctuation in this
power,  differences  in  essence  will  have  as  a  necessary  consequence
differences in the natures of affects. So, for example, the nature of all  my
joys as a particular entity with a unique essence will  necessarily differ
from the nature of all of my sister's joys (and from all the joys experienced
by every other particular) at least because my essential powers are unique
to me and distinct from her essential powers. In second place, it means
that all of my and my sister's  essentially “human” joys will necessarily
differ from the joys of every dragonfly and every fish at least insofar as the
two groups of affects will involve fluctuations in two different kinds of
essential powers.33 It is in this sense and for this reason, I suggest, that
Spinoza thinks that “brutes” must “feel” differently from us. 
2. Problems with the initial account 
In  the  preceding  section  I  tried  to  illuminate  some  of  the  ways  that
Spinoza's  thinking  about  the  ontology  of  affects  is  rooted  in  his  more
general  metaphysical  commitments  about  minds  and  bodies,  essences,
33 On  this  reading,  I  can  thus  be  represented  abstractly  (or  generally)  but
nonetheless adequately as experiencing certain affects qua “human”, insofar
as I'm genuinely similar to other particulars (for example, to my sister. But I
will also experience certain affects insofar as I am a unique particular with a
unique  essence  and  unique  essential  causal  powers.  This  opens  up  the
possibility that a particular affection may increase my power qua particular,
but not insofar as I'm considered abstractly qua “human”.
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causes, and powers. As we saw there,  Spinoza's view of the mind-body
relation underpins  his  understanding of  the composition of  affects;  his
views  about  the  natures  of  minds  and  causes  lead  him  to  assert  the
universality of affects; and his conception of essence – in particular his
identification of essence and power – is instrumental in establishing the
necessity of essential differences in affects.  At this point in our inquiry,
Spinoza's  metaphysics  and his  psychology may thus  indeed  appear  to
form a consistent  whole,  in  line  with Spinoza's  ambition to  derive  his
psychology and ethics from his metaphysics.
Unfortunately  on closer  scrutiny matters  begin to look less  rosy.
The problem is this. Spinoza is explicit that the “power” that fluctuates in
affects is the very same “power” that is identical to things' essences. (As
he notes in E3p57d, “Joy and Sadness are passions by which each one's
power,  or  [sive] striving  to  persevere  in  its  being,  is  increased  or
diminished”.)34 The  problem  is  that  this  seems  to  undermine  the
possibility  of  any  kind  of  robust  diachronic  identity  for  finite  things
within  Spinoza's  framework.  For  if  a  thing's  essence  is  identical  to  a
power, and if all finite things are constantly open to changes in this same
power (both because of their own striving and because of encounters with
antagonistic external causes), then it is unclear that any finite thing can
persist as self-same through affective experiences. This is because  every
affect  by definition  marks  a  new degree  (and perhaps  also  quality)  of
power, and thus, it would seem, brings about a change in the essence of a
thing. And so with every affect, a new and different thing – one endowed
with a distinct essence – seems to come into being.35
34 Cf. also E3p28d and E3p55c[2]d (II/183). Thanks to Sam Rickless for discussion
of this point.
The  passage  extracted  from  E3p57d  mentions  only  passive  affects
(those brought about in part by external causes) but presumably Spinoza also
would want to claim that “active joy is an affect by which each one's power, or
striving to persevere in its  being,  is  increased.” Spinoza's focus on passive
affects  is  to  be  expected:  they  constitute  the  “servitude”  he  wishes  us  to
escape.
35  Leibniz raises a related worry about Spinoza's picture of the mind as an idea
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Spinoza  himself  seems  to  acknowledge  this  consequence  of  his
doctrines explicitly, writing that affects re-”constitute” a thing's essential
“nature”:
desire is the very essence, or nature, of each insofar as it is conceived to
be determined, by whatever constitution he has, to do something
(see [E3]p9s). Therefore,  as each is affected  by external causes  with
this or that species of Joy, Sadness, Love, Hate, etc. – i.e., as his nature is
constituted in one way or the other, so his Desires vary [cupiditas est ipsa
uniuscujusque  essentia  seu  natura  quatenus  ex  data  quacunque  ejus
constitutione determinata  concipitur  ad  aliquid  agendum...;  ergo  prout
unusquisque a causis externis hac aut illa laetitiae, tristitiae, amoris, odii
etc.  specie  afficitur  hoc  est  prout  ejus  natura  hoc  aut  alio  modo
constituitur,  ita  ejus  cupiditas  alia  atque  alia  esse]  (E3p56d;  II/185;
emphasis added)36
Spinoza's claim in the passage is that affects “constitute” a thing's essence
in various ways. The passage thus seems to confirm what is suggested by
the account I have thus far attributed to Spinoza, namely that with every
affect a new essence comes into being. 
If this is indeed Spinoza's position, this opens him up to a number
of a changeable body: “according to Spinoza, at any given moment, a soul will
be different, since, when the body changes, the idea of the body is different.
Hence,  we  shouldn't  be  surprised  if  he  takes  creatures  for  vanishing
modifications... Spinoza's soul is so transitory that it does not exist even for a
moment,  since  the  body  also  does  not  remain  the  same”  (Comments  on
Spinoza's Philosophy, 277).
See Alanen 2012 and Schmitter 2014 for discussions of Spinoza's affects
in relation to other questions of identity.  
36 Again (cf. footnote 34) this passage addresses explicitly only passive affects, in
line with Spinoza's focus on them. However, it seems to me that there is no
reason why the claim of affective reconstitution would not hold equally for
active affects: those too constitute a thing's nature. (Even passive affects are in
part due to a thing's own nature [E2ax1''].)
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of objections.  These can be divided into two groups:  those that can be
answered  with  relative  ease,  and  those  that  genuinely  warrant
abandoning the account as it stands. I'll start with the former. 
To begin with, my account – and, more specifically, the way that
account characterizes the relation between a thing's essence and affective
changes in its power – burdens Spinoza with a profligate and implausible
ontology: where common sense and everyday phenomenology are likely
to  posit  one  entity,  Spinoza  sees  a  potentially  infinite  series  of  highly
ephemeral  individuals,  each existing only in the timeslice between two
consecutive  affects.37 Likewise,  the  account  runs  afoul  of  the  common-
sense conviction  that finite things can, and typically do, persist through
emotional upheavals and changes in power. (Heartbreak may be painful
but in most cases, thankfully, it is not literally fatal.) Moreover, it's unclear
that  Spinoza's  theory  of  the  affects,  so  interpreted,  is  any  longer
recognizable as  an account  of  “emotions”.  For  presumably a theory of
emotions is meant to bear not on an individual's wholesale generation and
corruption but rather on her states.38 Spinoza elsewhere explicitly attends
to the difference between these two kinds of changes,39 and the fact that he
37 Appeals to common sense suffer from well-known difficulties; since, as noted,
I  will  ultimately  discount these  objections,  I  will  not  try  to  defend  any
particular account of common sense here.
 A concern with offering a “plausible” reading of a philosopher usually
doesn't need defense; this is less so in the case of Spinoza, who is viewed as
advancing  “bold”  and  counterintuitive  views.  I  do  not  wish  to  unduly
domesticate Spinoza, nor do I take plausibility as the definitive criterion of
what counts as a good interpretation of his doctrines; nonetheless I think that
in the particular case on the table plausibility is a concern worth keeping an
eye on, not least because as we shall see his views on affects will turn out to be
more orthodox than some of his other doctrines.
38 More accurately, and depending on one's preferred ontology, on her neuro-
psychological  or  computational  states,  or  her  physiological  processes  or
perceptions thereof, adaptive dispositions, evaluative judgments, etc (see De
Sousa, §7). 
39 In CM 2.4 Spinoza distinguishes “change” (“whatever variation there can be
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seems  to fail to distinguish between them here  threatens disaster for his
whole project in the Ethics. This is because one of his principal objectives
in that work is to free us from servitude to passive affects. But if Spinoza's
metaphysics has no room for individuals who can persist through affects,
then it's unclear that we can even make sense any longer of the idea of
such servitude: if affects create and destroy individuals, then one and the
same thing cannot be both enslaved and free. Instead, to escape affective
servitude is instead to altogether cease to be.
This then is the first way one could object to the account of affects
that  I  have  offered  thus  far.  However,  as  noted,  this  particular  set  of
objections  can  be  warded  off  with  relative  ease.  First,  as  regards  the
alleged contrariness  of  Spinoza's  ontology  and psychology to  common
sense and to the data of ordinary experience, for better or worse this is
typical  of Spinoza's  preferred methodology:  in his  view common sense
and ordinary experience simply do not count as good reasons to tinker
with the results of apriori demonstrations.40 Likewise, even if Spinoza is
radically  reinterpreting  emotions,  their  relation  to  individuation,  and
what it means to be in a condition of affective servitude, there does not
seem  to  be  anything  intrinsically  incoherent  about  the  purported
reinterpretations themselves. Similarly, an  ontology of highly ephemeral
beings is not in itself incoherent – nor is it without historical precedent.41
Indeed such an ontology would fit well  with Spinoza's other doctrines.
Consider for example his notorious refusal to grant finite things the status
of  “substances” (E2p10):  one  of  the  properties  traditionally  ascribed to
substances  was  precisely  persistence  through  change.  Or  recall  his
in  a  subject  while  the  very  essence  of  the  subject  remains  intact”)  from
“transformation”  (“that  change  in  which there  is  no  transformation  of  the
subject, as when we say that Peter has changed his color, or his ways”) (I/255).
For the locus classicus of the distinction see Aristotle, Physics I.7.   
40 See E1app[I-II] (II/78-80); E4pref (II/207).
41 Moreover, recall that Spinoza identifies only actual (but not formal) essences
with power. Formal essences are not subject to fluctuations in power; they are
eternal and unchanging. To this extent even if the objection is correct it does
not show that sub specie aeternitatis finite things lack a robust identity.
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remarks about the amnesiac “Spanish poet”, his most sustained treatment
of  personal  identity  in  the  Ethics  (E4p39s;  II/240).  Spinoza's  conclusion
there is that there is no compelling reason to believe that biological death
is the only kind of death. A defender of the preliminary account could
claim that  according Spinoza there  is  equally  no compelling reason to
believe that affective deaths are not happening around us all the time.42
In short, it seems then that this first group of objections does not
warrant abandoning the account I have given. Nonetheless, the claim that
Spinozistic  affects  corrupt  and  generate  individuals  is  genuinely
problematic, albeit for a different reason than those already examined. The
real problem with that claim is very basic: it is that it contradicts Spinoza's
explicit  textual  commitment  to  the  ability  of  finite  things to  persist
through  affective  changes.  (On  this  point  Spinoza  thus  seems to  align
himself with ordinary understanding and philosophical tradition after all.)
The textual evidence on this point is not abundant, but there are at
least two places in the Ethics where this commitment comes through quite
clearly. In the first passage, Spinoza writes that
Men can disagree in nature insofar as they are torn by affects which
are  passions;  and  to  that  extent  also  one  and  the  same  man  is  
changeable and inconstant [unus idemque homo varius est et inconstans] 
(E4p33; emphasis added). 
Secondly, in the Preface to Part 4, dedicated to “Human Bondage,  or the
42  For  other  examples  of  doctrines  congenial  to  the  ontology  of  ephemeral
individuals consider (i) Spinoza's insistence on the irrelevance of duration to a
thing's essential identity (E4pref; II/208); (ii) his embrace of the Principle of
Plenitude,  which  stipulates  the  existence  of  a  maximal  number  of  beings
(E1App;  II/83);  and (iii)  his  quasi-functionalist  criteria  of  individuation,
according  to  which  it  is  legitimate  to  view  as  “one  singular  thing”  any
collection  of  individuals  that  produces  “one”  effect  (E2def7).  A “singular
thing” so defined can presumably be extremely transient – as transient as the
grounds for it being considered “one”. On Spinoza's Principle of Plenitude see
Newlands 2010, on his weak criteria of individuation, Melamed 2010. 
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Powers of the Affects”, Spinoza notes
when  I  say  that  someone  passes  from  a  lesser  to  a  greater
perfection, and the opposite,  I do not understand that he is changed
from one essence,  or  form, to  another  [cum dico aliquem a  minore  ad
majorem perfectionem transire et contra, me non intelligere quod ex una
essentia  seu  forma  in  aliam  mutatur].  For  example,  a  horse  is
destroyed [destruitur] as much if it is changed [mutetur] into a man
as if it is changed into an insect. Rather, we conceive that his power
of acting, insofar as it is understood through his nature, is increased or
diminished  [ejus  agendi  potentiam  quatenus  haec  per  ipsius  naturam
intelligitur, augeri vel minui]. (E4pref; II/208; emphases added)43
In this second passage Spinoza seems to consider and then reject precisely
the  sort  of  account  I  have  attributed  to  him  above:  he  explicitly
distinguishes  changes  in  a  thing's  degree  of  power  from  a  wholesale
change of its essence (i.e., from its “destruction”). Instead, he insists that
changes  in  power  must  be  “understood  through”  a  thing's  essential
nature. So his view seems to be that affects, as a certain type of change, are
made intelligible by reference to an unchanging underlying nature (even if
this nature no longer merits the label “substantial”).44 It seems then that,
43 Since this passage mentions only what we could describe as 'species-essences'
(horses, insects, human beings), one might think that Spinoza could grant here
that  affective  changes  result  in  different  particular  essences,  though  the
individual  remains  of  the  same  species.  But  this  reading  would  still  be
inconsistent with passages like E4p33. Thanks to Nate Rockwood for pressing
me on this point.
On  the  terminology  of  “power  of  acting”  see  footnote  22  above.
Lebuffe 2009:196 also draws attention to this passage
44 Spinoza uses the “understand through” locution in this sense of referring to
what makes a thing intelligible in other passages, including E3def1 (“I call [the
cause]  partial,  or  inadequate,  if  its  effect  cannot  be  understood through it
alone”); E4def8 (“[virtue] is the very essence, or nature, of man, insofar as he
has  the  power  of  bringing about  certain  things,  which  can be  understood
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contrary  to  the  account  of  affects  I  have  offered  above,  for  Spinoza
affective changes in power are not only consistent with a thing retaining
its  essential  nature  (and  so  consistent  with  its  ability  to  persist  as
essentially  self-same through various  affects);  such affective changes  in
power also  require for their intelligibility the existence of such a nature.
And, as is well known, for Spinoza intelligibility of all that is is a non-
negotiable requirement (E1ax2, E1p11altd1).45  
Such passages as the two cited above suggest then not only that
Spinoza's  theory  of  affects  does  not  in  fact  generate  the  problems
identified by the first group of objections (the problems of a profligate
ontology,  an  inconsistent  notion  of  servitude,  and  so  on);  more
importantly,  such passages suggest that,  contrary to the account I  have
given, but also contrary I believe to the standard reading of Spinoza, we
cannot  simply identify  Spinozistic  “power”  and  “essence”,  without
further qualifications. This is in the sense that not every change in one
amounts to a change in the other: a thing's power can change while its
essence or nature can – and, for the sake of intelligibility, must – stay the
same.46
The account of Spinozistic affects that I proposed in Section 1 thus
cannot  be  correct;  in  particular,  it  cannot  be  correct  in  the  way  it
characterizes the relation between a thing's essence and affective changes
in its essential powers. What we need is an account that can explain how
affective changes in such powers can be consistent with an unchanging
through the laws of his nature alone”).  See also E4p4, E4p35d, 4p64d, and
E4App2. 
45 On Spinoza's commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason see especially
Della Rocca 2008, 2008b. 
46 It's possible to draw a different conclusion from E4pref: because changes in
power require for their intelligibility an unchanging substratum, but Spinoza
does  not  provide  such  a  substratum  (since  he  deprives  finite  things  of
substantiality), it follows that the changes in power, and with them affects, are
unintelligible. Given that by the PSR all that is is intelligible, both the changes
and the affects  are in metaphysical  rigour illusory.  For a similar argument
from a different starting point see Della Rocca 2008.
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essential  identity  of  the  thing,  despite  Spinoza's  commitment  to  the
identity of these powers to a thing's essence. To put the problem slightly
differently,  we  need  a  better  way  of  articulating  the  conditions  of  the
identity of a thing's essential powers, such that the sorts of changes that
these powers undergo in the course of affective experiences do not cause
the powers in question to cease being the powers that they are.47
The job of the next two sections of the paper will be to offer such an
account.48
3. The amended account: essences as “constituted”
To see where my initial account went wrong let's return to  E3p56d, the
passage  which  earlier  I  took  to  corroborate  that  account  and  the
unorthodox  picture  of  individuation  through  affects  that  it  implied.
Clearly, if the account is incorrect, the appearance of textual corroboration
must likewise be illusory. The question then is, is E3p56d amenable to a
different interpretation?
47 Manning's  pessimistic  conclusion  is  that  Spinoza  does  not  offer  such
conditions of identity of powers: “the notion of the individual essence of a
body  conceived  as  a  power  to  maintain  itself  is  of  dubious  intelligibility.
Spinoza clearly believes that an individual's power to persevere can increase
or diminish. But if this power is to constitute the thing's essence and identity,
such changes in degree cannot alter the identity of the power. But what then
constitutes the individuality and identity of a power? In this light, the account
of  individuation  by  essence  seems  unexplanatory:  either  it  amounts  to  an
elaborate name for the problem of the individuation of bodies it is supposed
to  solve,  or  it  simply  displaces  the  same  sort  of  problem  from  bodies  to
powers” (2012: 5.3).
48 In a somewhat different context,  Donagan proposes what could serve as  a
solution to a problem at hand: he argues that we must distinguish higher- and
lower-order  powers  within  Spinozistic  striving,  where  only  the  latter  are
subject to fluctuation, and only the former are identical to a thing's essence
(1988:192-3).  The problem with this proposal  is  that it  doesn't  have textual
support, either for the distinction between the two orders of powers, nor for
relating identity conditions and power fluctuations to distinct orders. 
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The crucial part of that passage – the part that I took to corroborate
my initial  account – is  Spinoza's  assertion that  “as each [individual]  is
affected … with this or that species of Joy, Sadness, Love, Hate, etc. – i.e.,
as his nature is constituted in one way or the other, so his Desires vary”,
where “desire is the very essence, or nature, of each [thing]” (E3p56d). The
claim that different affects “constitute” a thing's essence in different ways
corroborates  my  initial  account  on  the  assumption  that  for  x  to
“constitute” y is for x to make y be, bring it into being, to form or compose
it either wholly or essentially. And this, to be sure, is a natural gloss of that
term. It is also a gloss that fits well with how Spinoza uses  constituere  in
other contexts. Consider, for example, his remark that 
The being of substance does not pertain to the essence of man, or 
substance does not constitute the form of man. [...T]he essence of  
man is  constituted [constituit]  by certain  modifications  of  God's  
attributes (E2p10&c).49 
Nonetheless, in another passage Spinoza himself offers a rather different
gloss of the term. He writes,  
Desire is man's very essence, insofar as it is conceived to be determined,
from any given affection of it, to do something. 
Expl. ...For  by an affection of the human essence we understand
any  constitution  of  that  essence  [per  affectionem  humanae  essentiae
quamcunque ejusdem essentiae constitutionem intelligimus], whether it
is innate [NS: or has come from outside]... . Here, therefore, by the
49 For other passages that suit this initial gloss of “constitute” see e.g. “although
two attributes may be conceived to be really  distinct...we still  cannot infer
from  that  that  they  constitute  two  beings,  or  two  different  substances]”
(E1p10s; II/52).  There is a lot controversy about the nature of the substance-
attribute relation, but it seems at least plausible to think that for an attribute to
“constitute” the essence of substance (E1def4) means that an attribute brings,
or is perceived as bringing, (a) substantial essence into being. 
See also E2p11 and Descartes Pr 1.53, 63.
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word  Desire  I  understand  any  of  a  man's  strivings,  impulses,
appetites, and volitions, which vary [varii] as the man's constitution
varies, and which are not infrequently so opposed [oppositi] to one
another that the man is pulled in different directions and knows
not where to turn. (E3DefAffI; II/190; emphasis added)50
Here  the  suggestion  is  that  a  “constitution”  of  an  essence  is  to  be
understood as an “affection” of  that  essence.  On this understanding of
constituere,  for  an  affect  to  “constitute”  an  essence  would  be  for  it  to
merely determine or modify this essence – not, as on my initial account, to
bring it into being as a whole. 
Prima facie this second interpretation of constituere does not seem to
suit all the passages in which that term appears. (To give just one example,
it is  difficult  to  construe  “constitution”  as  “modification”  in  E2p10&c,
where  Spinoza  asserts  that  human  essence  is  “constituted”  by  certain
modifications of the attributes, and not by substance. For it makes little
sense for Spinoza to suddenly oppose in Part 2 the thesis that “human
essence is modified by substance” – which, as we know from Part 1, cannot
be “in” anything else  [E1def3],  in favour of  the tautological  claim that
“human essence is modified by certain modifications”. In contrast, it would
make sense for Spinoza to intend here “constitute” in the first sense of
“bringing  into  being”  wholly  or  essentially.  On  that  reading  of  the
passage, Spinoza would opposing there the widely-held view that human
beings are substances,  in favour of the thesis that we consist merely in
modifications of substances.)51 
It seems, in short, that we have in front of us at least one passage –
E3DefAffIexpl – where Spinoza identifies “constitution” with “affection”
50 E3p5d rules out that an essence could by itself give rise to “opposed” (and not
merely different) affections. 
51  Likewise, it seems implausible that the point of E1p10s would be that “really
distinct”  attributes  needn't  “modify”  different  entities,  since  this  would
amount  to conflating attributes and modes,  contrary to  well-known,  if  not
well understood, Spinoza's identification of attributes with substance (see e.g.
E1p4d).
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or “modification”,  and at least  one passage – E2p10&c – that  seems to
require  us  to  gloss  “constitution”  as  “bringing  into  being”  wholly  or
essentially.  Are we dealing here simply with a case of equivocation, or
with a failure to use a term systematically? This of course is a possibility.
But  another  reading seems to  be both more philosophically interesting
and more charitable to Spinoza. On that reading, which I wish to endorse,
we  would  gloss  “constituting”  as  bringing  into  being  (forming,
composing, etc), but with the caveat that this relation is subject to degrees ,
analogously  to  the  Spinozistic  relation  of  causation.  That  is,  just  as
according to Spinoza x can cause y to be, or to have a certain property, to
different degrees, such that x can be either an adequate (complete) or an
inadequate (partial) cause of  y's existing or having this or that property
(E3def1), I suggest that in Spinoza's view things can also be “constituted”
– brought into being – to different degrees. Namely, x can “constitute” y in
the sense that x makes y up exhaustively (in this sense Spinoza can claim
in  E2p10&c  that  certain  modifications  of  attributes,  and  not  anything
substantial, “constitute” human essence), but  x  can also merely partially
contribute to bringing  y  into being, by making it be in a certain way, or
with respect to certain properties. And this analogy between the nature of
causal relations and constitution relations is no accident. For presumably
constitution as a certain kind of bringing into being is just a certain kind of
causal relation.
If  we accept  this  amended gloss  of  “constitution”,  we no longer
have to read E3p56d as corroborating the discredited initial account, with
its  individuation  through  affects  and  an  extravagant  ontology  of
ephemeral beings. For on the modified construal of “constitution”, when
Spinoza says that affects “constitute” a thing's essence this does not mean
(as on the initial account) that with each affect a new entity, with a distinct
essence, is generated. Rather it means that a thing's essence is modified in
a certain way. On this account, a finite thing can thus persist as essentially
the same thing through different affects, and Spinoza is cleared of all the
difficulties  imputed  to  him  thus  far,  even  those  (such  as  ontological
profligacy) that in the end were deemed relatively trivial. 
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I suggest then that what we should say is that according to Spinoza,
an affect “constitutes” a thing's essence in the sense that an affect modifies
or  determines  this  essence.  More  precisely,  to  borrow  from E3p56,  an
affect modifies or determines this essence as a particular desire or appetite –
for a certain object or state of being, or as a particular volition – to do this
or  that.52 Conversely,  particular  desires,  appetites  and  volitions  are  all
particular  modifications of  a  thing's  essence and,  what  amounts to  the
same, particular modifications of a thing's essential power. For example,
under the attribute of  thought,  to  say that  an affect  modifies  a thing's
essential power in a certain way means, as we have already seen, that a
mind is “determine[d] ... to think of this rather than that” (E3GenDefAff;
II/203) – to produce an idea of this or that object, or of this or that state of
being.  That  a  mind is  determined in  an affect  of  think a  specific  idea
(perhaps of God, or of the “beauty of green plants”) is, as we have also
seen,  also  a  determination  of  this  mind  to  a  certain  degree  of  mental
power (the power to produce a greater or lesser variety of more or less
fecund ideas).  It  is also, for Spinoza, a determination of this mind as a
particular volition (to become more God-like, for example).53
4. The amended account: essences as determinable
The 'amended' account I wish to endorse in this paper requires that we
treat Spinozistic essences as at least in part intrinsically determinable (that
is,  intrinsically subject  to modifications or affections),  with  affects,  as a
52  For Spinoza all these terms – “desire”, “appetite”, “volition” – are attribute-
sensitive  ways  of  referring to  a  thing's  essential  power (E3p9s).  “Volition”
names this power in relation to the mind alone, whereas both “desire” and
“appetite” refer to the power of mind and body considered together. For more
detailed accounts see e.g. Bennett 1984, Lebuffe 2009, Hübner forthcoming-a.
53 We are now in a position to refine the explanation given in Section 1 of what
grounds essential differences in affects: such differences are grounded in the
fact that particular things (and kinds of things) differ in terms of how their
essences  can  be  determined.  In  other  words,  human-affects  and  goldfish-
affects necessarily differ according to Spinoza at least because their essential
powers are determinable in different ways.
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certain type of causal event (the sort that results in a change in a thing's
essential powers) supplying the relevant determinations. To return to the
question we posed above – How can a thing's  essence be identical,  as
Spinoza  claims,  to  a  changing  “power”?  –  we  can  now  respond  that
Spinoza takes an essence to be the sort of thing that by its very nature is
capable  of  undergoing  modifications.  In  other  words,  for  Spinoza  the
identity of  power and essence means that  an essence can be variously
determined as particular “strivings, impulses, appetites, and volitions”. 
That Spinoza might regard essences as subject to determination or
modification in  this  way hasn't  often been  noted,  to  my knowledge at
least.  Bennett  is  an  exception  here:  he  acknowledges  in  passing  that
Spinoza indeed speaks of “states” of an “essence”, but goes on to dismiss
this as a merely “odd” way of referring to the states of an individual.54 I
think this dismissal is  a misjudgement on Bennett's part. For unless we
accept  that  Spinoza  very  much  intends  to  treat  essences  as  subject  to
modification we will  fail  to  understand the basic  causal  mechanism of
Spinozistic  affects,  as  well  as  the  nature  of  the  identity  of  power  and
essence. 
Nonetheless, it's worth pausing over the question of why one might
be  inclined  to  dismiss  the  idea  that  Spinozistic  essences  are  variously
determinable. There are it seems to me at least two possible motivations.
Considering them here will allow me to flesh out my account further.
First  of all,  one may object  to  my talk of Spinozistic  essences as
“determinable”  on  the  grounds  that  within  Spinoza's  necessitarian
framework such unrealized potentialities cannot be, and a fortiori cannot
be ontologically fundamental in the way that I seem to be suggesting.55
But this is a  superficial – merely terminological – misunderstanding. To
clarify,  my talk of determinability is not meant to suggest that Spinoza
54 1984:222.
55 See E1p17s[I] (II/62), E1p31s. 
There is also a debate among contemporary metaphysicians whether
determinables  can  play  the  role  of  ontologically  fundamental  (or  at  least
relatively fundamental) entities. For a defense see e.g. Wilson 2012. 
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allows  for  mere  potentialities,  or  that  he  treats  them  as  ontologically
fundamental. To put things more precisely, on the reading I'm proposing,
the  essence  of  a  finite  thing  is  identical  not  to  a  mere  potentiality  for
determination but to  the entirety – the whole series, so to speak – of  the
ways  in  which  this  essence  will  be  necessarily  determined over  the
duration of the thing's existence.56 The talk of essences as determinable is
meant to be a shorthand for this more precise claim.57
The  second  reason  why  one  might  want  to  reject  the  idea  of
modifiable  essences  is  because  one  might  think  that  modifications  or
determinations should be attributed only to  things, not however to their
essences, at least in Spinoza's framework but perhaps more generally. On
this objection, essences are simply the wrong kind of thing to be modified.
So  if  Spinoza  talks  about  the  affections  of  an  essence,  as  he  does  in
E3DefAffI,  this  is  only  because  (once  again)58 he  fails  to  properly
distinguish between things and their essences, and hence attributes to the
essences  of  things  what  is  in  fact  attributable  only  to  the  things
themselves.
This second objection as it stands is also defeasible I think.  Rather
than charging Spinoza with a failure to mark a rudimentary distinction, it
seems more charitable to take him at his word and conclude that he holds
a very broad conception of the possible scope of relations of determination
or  modification,  and  takes  such  relations  to  apply  to  things  and  their
essences  alike.  That  he  does  so  is  arguably  confirmed  by  the  way  he
characterizes  the  essence  of  substance:  this  essence  too  is  subject  to
modification, indeed to all possible modifications (E1p16).59
56 Presumably the eternal  “formal” essence of a thing will  then be either the
totality of this series of determinations of essence or the rule for that series.
Read in this way, Spinozistic essences seem to anticipate Leibnizian monads,
whose states unfold according to an eternal rule. 
Cf. also Schrijvers 1999:69. 
57 Compare Spinoza's talk of “potential intellect” in E1p31s. 
58 For this charge in a different context see Della Rocca 1996:214, 259 n 24.  
59 Likewise,  the  idea  of  a  modifiable  essence  is  arguably  implicit  also  in
Spinoza's  talk of  “modifications of  God's attributes” (E2p10c);  as we know
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But one can sharpen this objection as follows. Even if Spinoza is
committed to this broader conception of determination, all the worse for
him, because the very idea of a modified essence is inconsistent with his
other  doctrines.  In  particular,  allowing for the essences  of  things to be
modified  in  various  ways  undermines  (goes  the  objection)  his  own
definition  of  essence.  For,  as  we  have  seen,  E2def2  implies  that  a
Spinozistic essence is, minimally,  the set of of properties necessary and
sufficient for a thing to actually exist. That is, it is minimally the properties
a  thing  must  have  to  actually  exist  as  the  thing  that  it  is.  But  this
conception of essence seems to be inconsistent with the idea of essences
being modifiable or determinable in various ways. For, if the essence of x
can undergo different and passing modifications, in what sense does it
consist in the necessary conditions of being x? If the essences of things can
be differently determined, modified or “constituted”, this seems to imply
that  the  essential  properties  of  a  thing  can  undergo  change  without,
paradoxically, any change in the essential natures of those things. So the
necessary conditions for being  x  are after all  not genuinely necessary for
being x, since they can, it seems, be acquired and lost.
This  version  of  the  second objection restates  the  problem at  the
heart of this paper – the problem of reconciling Spinoza's metaphysical
theses  about  essences  (such  as  those  expressed  in  E2def2)  with  his
psychological commitment to the variability of essences. If, as the objector
insists, we must reject the notion of a determinable essence as inconsistent
with E2def2, not only can we not accept my 'amended' account, we are
also confronted with the very real possibility that Spinoza's conception of
from E1def4, an attribute “constitutes” (brings into being) substantial essence.
It's  not  clear  if  we  should  say  that  the  essence  of  substance is  also
intrinsically determinable. On the one hand this would fit well with Spinoza's
naturalism (since it would make the essence of substance and the essence of
modes alike in this respect).  It would also help answer the Hegelian worry
about why, according to Spinoza, there must be a world of modes in addition
to substance (see e.g. Hegel 1995, 3.256-61). On the other hand, it's not clear
that this answer would satisfy Hegel, since it seems to appeal to a brute fact
about essences (that they are intrinsically determinable). 
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essence is simply inconsistent across his psychology and his metaphysics. 
Fortunately,  I  think  that  this  version  of  the  objection  too  is
surmountable.  To  see  how  this  may  be  the  case,  recall  the  following
passage  from  the  early  Short  Treatise,  in  which  Spinoza  outlines  the
conditions of physical diachronic identity:
if … a body has and preserves its proportion - say of 1 to 3 - the
soul and the body will be like ours now are; they will, of course, be
constantly subject to change, but not to such a great change that it goes
beyond the limits of from 1 to 3 ... But if other bodies act on ours with
such force that the proportion of motion [to rest] cannot remain 1 to
3, that is death, and a destruction of the soul (KV2pref[12-14]; I/52;
emphasis added)
To be sure, the question raised in the above passage (of the conditions of
physical identity over time) is  not interchangeable with, or reducible to,
the  question  we  are  concerned  with  (that  of  the  determinability  of
essences).  For  one,  our  question  is  posed  at  a  more  fundamental
ontological level, that of essences generally, considered highly abstractly,
for irrespectively of attribute.60 Nonetheless, I think that we can use the
above  passage  to  reconstruct  how  Spinoza  might  think  about  the
determinability of essences, in a way that would make that commitment
consistent with his other claims about essences.
What interests me about the above passage in particular is the idea
that  there  are  limits  to  the  changes  that  a  body  can  undergo  that  are
consistent with this body remaining one and the same (that is, retaining its
60 Another potential difference between the two questions is that it's not clear
that the physical changes discussed by Spinoza in the Physical Digression for
example can also be described as new determinations or “constitutions” of a
body's essence. That is, it's not clear that a change that does not alter a body's
essence  (for  example,  a  change  in  the  direction  of  motion  of  constituent
bodies) counts as an affection (determination, constitution) of that essence, as
opposed to a merely accidental change in the body of the individual endowed
with that essence. 
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essential  “ratio” of  motion to  rest),61 and the implicit  suggestion in  the
passage that it is the  essence  of this body that determines these limits. I
want to suggest that we apply this idea of an essentially predetermined
range of permissible changes to the problem of determination of essences
in affective experience. More specifically, I want to propose that we grant
that according to Spinoza the essence of  a thing is in part  intrinsically
determinable, but with the caveat that it is determinable in such a manner
as  to  be  subject  to  a  specific  qualitative  and  quantitative  range of
determinations. On this reading, to be a particular thing – or a certain kind
of thing – is inter alia to be intrinsically determinable in specific ways and
within specific limits, beyond which a thing ceases to be. So yes, essential
powers (to reason, to move, to swim, and so on) are, according to Spinoza,
subject  to  affective fluctuations,  but  proper to  every essence is  also an
enduring and unchanging range of possible – viable – fluctuations. This
range of possible fluctuations proper to an essence is, I suggest, one sense
in which changes in a thing's power must be “understood”, as Spinoza
writes, “through [its] nature” (E4pref). 
How does this picture address the worry with which we started,
the  worry  about  the  consistency  of  my  characterization  of  Spinozistic
essences as subject to various and passing determinations with Spinoza's
own definition of essence in terms of necessary and sufficient properties?
My suggestion is that the limits to possible determinations are among the
properties necessary and sufficient for a thing to be what it is. That is,
what does not change about a thing's essential identity, what is necessary
and sufficient for it to be itself, is, among other things, precisely this range
of fluctuations in its essential powers that a thing can undergo without
ceasing to be. 
In  short,  on  the  plausible  assumption  that  we  can  allow  that  a
thing's  essence  may  be  identical  to  a  multiplicity of  different  powers,
rather than to a single  power, it seems that we should say the following
61 On  how  Spinoza  might  understand  this  ratio,  including  how  literally  we
should take his use of numbers to describe it in  KV,  see e.g. Barbone 2002;
Bennett 1984; Garrett 1994; Gueroult 1974; Manning 2012; Matheron 1969.
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on  Spinoza's  behalf:  the  essence  of  a  thing  is  not  identical  to  power
simpliciter (as his thesis is usually put). Rather, the essence of a thing is
identical to a certain set of powers, each of which has a certain qualitative
or  quantitative  range  of  permissible  exercise.  Furthermore  the  powers
themselves bear to one another certain relations which themselves are also
subject to ranges of permissible variation.62 So for example, applied to a
goldfish, it would not be just the power to swim, or even to swim at a
particular range of speeds, that would constitute her essence, but rather
the relation of her various essential powers with their particular ranges: a
power to swim at certain speeds, a power to detect certain intensities of
light, to digest and excrete certain kinds of microscopic nutrients, etc. It is
this mutual relation of particular powers – more precisely, a viable (or, in
Spinoza's terminology, “moderate”) state of that relation of all the powers
– that,  I  suggest,  constitutes the unity of a thing's essence in Spinoza's
metaphysics. 
Presumably we can decide case by case whether a given change in a
thing's  collection  of  powers  still  permits  us  to  count  this  thing  as
essentially  the  same.  In  some  cases  perhaps  there  will  be  no  obvious
answer, as suggested by Spinoza's rather tentative remarks a propos the
amnesiac Spanish poet.63 Some affective experiences may indeed exceed
what  a  thing  can  bear,  given  what  it  essentially  is.  This  would  be
heartbreak understood quite literally.64
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